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Abu Graib, Guantanamo, the War on Terror—the debate over the use of torture is still
very much alive in the world today. The debate can be divided into two questions: (1) whether
there should be an actual absolute ban where torture is never allowed either ethically or legally,
and (2) if torture should be allowed under certain circumstances what form of regulation is best
able to ensure that it is used only in those most limited circumstances. Currently, there is an
absolute ban in place, yet world leaders, applying a case-by-case utilitarian approach, in fact
permit the use of torture in what they deem to be extreme circumstances, despite the ‘absolute
ban.’
Assuming, as a result, that torture will never be eliminated completely and that it is, in
fact, desirable in certain situations, the question becomes: what form of regulation most
appropriately limits its use? The current system and any other system that uses a purported
absolute ban where exceptions and violations are nonetheless authorized at the highest levels
does not represent the most effective regulation because such systems force governments to
break the law. Such systems thereby promote secrecy and a concomitant lack of
accountability—two things antithetical to democracy, which requires an informed electorate.
Instead, a system that promotes those values and erects strict procedural safeguards represents
the most appropriate way to allow torture in the limited circumstances in which it may lead to the
better utilitarian outcome. Torture Warrants, if established appropriately, may represent such a
system.
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I.

Introduction
Civilized nations employ torture despite the apparent absolute ban on its use. Moreover,

these violations often go undetected, and more importantly, unpunished. The question is whether
a system that allows such disregard for the law represents the best we can do. Indeed, the current
absolute ban is not unassailable; the Vice President of the United States recently appealed to
Republican Senators to allow CIA exemptions to a possible ban on the torture of terror suspects
in U.S. custody.1 The historic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have rekindled the debate
on torture. It seems that the nature of the enemy has forced those prosecuting the War on Terror
to turn to different and often less than ideal means to wage it. As a result, academics must
address the torture issue not in an abstract or theoretical manner but instead in a way that can be
practically applied by our leaders.
While academics have debated the theoretical legality and morality of torture, in practice
the legal response is well established. The United Nations Convention against Torture placed an
absolute ban on torture, and the United States has signed that treaty, albeit with reservations.
Despite the uniformity in the law, however, torture is still practiced throughout the world—even
by nations that have signed the treaty. As a result, the torture question remains an important
issue worthy of continued discussion.
I propose that the absolute ban with no exceptions (hereinafter referred to as the
rhetorical or theoretical absolute ban) is inappropriate and lacks utility in a world in which
leaders in emergencies are guided by utilitarian goals that often militate in favor of ignoring the
ban. As a result, the framework for analyzing the torture question should not be binary (should
we allow it or not) but should instead recognize reality and focus on creating a system that limits
1
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the application of torture to the “appropriate” amount. The current system, an absolute ban often
ignored or undermined, does not yield this proper amount because it fosters secrecy, which
encourages inappropriate torture by preventing proper assessment of the appropriateness of
torture’s quantity and quality. I settle, somewhat reluctantly, on Alan Dershowitz’s Torture
Warrants as the appropriate system because it appears to be the best suited to limit the use of
torture to appropriate circumstances. I then attempt to lay the framework that will allow the
theoretical Torture Warrant proposal to become reality.
A.

The Current Law

In 1984, The United Nations General Assembly adopted the international Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).2 This
official ban of state torture represents a codification of longstanding prohibition in international
law.3 CAT provides that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever…may be invoked as a
justification of torture.”4 CAT represents the primary source of U.S. obligations regarding
torture and the United States ratified it in October 1994.5
The United States, however has only given limited effect to CAT. That is, the U.S.
adopted the Convention with a reservation—it binds the United States only so far as to be
2
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consistent with the Eighth Amendment.6 In that vein, decisions by U.S. courts have suggested
that the Eighth Amendment may allow preventive interrogation torture.7 Therefore, if the U.S.
employed physical force in certain circumstances it could arguably remain in compliance with its
treaty obligations.8
B.

Torture as a Means to an End: What is Torture and for What is it Used?

Torture, taken alone, has little definite meaning.9 In an effort to determine whether
particular actions amount to torture, authorities have often used a sliding scale. For example, the
European Convention on Human Rights has often defined torture by applying a “severity of
suffering” test.10 Applying a definition that exists on such a scale allows governments to justify
the actions taken by their agents as events that do not rise to the level of torture by arguing that
their interrogation techniques were lower on the scale.11 As a result, “the threshold test of
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suffering has been used in an attempt to fly below the radar on the absolute prohibition on
torture.”12
Torture, generally, represents a means to an end. In practice, there are two ends,
punishment and interrogation. The latter, however, can be divided into two subsets,
interrogation to elicit a confession and interrogation to elicit information necessary to prevent a
future harm.13
First, I turn to torture as a means to effect punishment.14 Use of torture to achieve this
end garners little support nationally or internationally. It has long been established in the United
States that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment bans the use of
torture for punishment.15 This ban is based on fundamental human dignity and decency and no
exception or justification exists to suggest otherwise.
Second, torture can be used as an interrogation technique. Interrogation, however, can
seek to elicit two different types of information, confessions and statements that can be used to
prevent future harms. While the latter could also be a confession, it is not necessarily so—an
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individual might possess knowledge of an attack without being guilty for its planning or for
carrying it out.
Torture has been used in the past to extract confessions from criminal suspects.16 A
confession in the purest sense of the word is an incriminating statement that ordinarily relates to
past activities. Use of torture to elicit such information has received treatment similar to that
accorded torture for punishment. The Supreme Court has prohibited such torture under the Due
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.17 On one hand, a stronger justification exists for
allowing this type of torture than for allowing torture to punish because it may help to put
criminals in prison. On the other hand, however, the ban stands largely uncontested because
such confessions are nearly universally thought unreliable. Moreover, the existence of other
investigative techniques provides alternatives such that this last resort need never be used.
The second use of torture in interrogation—to prevent future harm from occurring—
seems less well suited to the ban on torture.18 Preventive interrogation limits the use of torture to
efforts designed to gain information that will assist authorities in blocking an uncompleted
terrorist attack or other similarly imminent attack on innocent people.19 The purpose is
exclusively directed towards the future and is not concerned with eliciting confessions to be used
in a trial nor with punishing individuals for their past actions.20 The use of torture to achieve this
end has been subject to great debate since 9/11 and while prohibited by international law, reports
16
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suggesting its use are often cited. Given the inconsistent application of the absolute ban, many
academic papers have suggested that perhaps the absolute ban ought to be reconsidered with
respect to this use of torture.
C.

The Ticking Bomb Hypothetical

An often-discussed hypothetical, the ticking bomb emergency, is offered as moral and
legal support for relaxing the ban on torture when used to prevent future harms.21 In a ticking
bomb emergency, authorities have reason to believe that an individual has information about an
imminent harm to innocent lives that could still be prevented. The harm, however, can only be
prevented with the information the individual has. At the most extreme, this situation would
exist if an officer saw an individual arm a bomb that could be deactivated by a password that
only the individual knows. As a result, eliciting the password from the individual represents the
only way to prevent the loss of innocent life. At the other end of the ticking bomb spectrum,22
the situation would exist if officers knew or had cause to believe23 that an individual had
information material24 to the prevention of an act that would cause harm to innocent people. To
the lay reader, common sense and a simple cost-benefit analysis suggests that torture of one less-
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than-innocent individual is justified by the prospect of preventing harm to many innocent
people.25
The hypothetical, however, has its inadequacies. Of note, the hypothetical assumes near
perfect knowledge of the authorities and seems to focus on imminence. As an illustration of a
situation in which torture may be appropriate, the hypothetical is perhaps more useful if that
notion of imminence is broadened to focus less on timing and more on the absence of alternative
means of preventing terrorist attacks. It is the original and this broadened hypothetical,
discussed and evaluated below, that generally direct the discussion in this paper.
II.

Examining the Arguments For and Against the Rhetorical Absolute Ban on Torture
The arguments for and against the absolute ban on torture are numerous and both sides

have received support in the literature and elsewhere. In assessing the support for and against
the absolute ban on torture, it is important to note the two types of absolute bans. One is the
theoretical true absolute ban discussed with moral-type arguments for which no justification or
excuse exists. The other is a legal absolute ban discussed with more practical reasoning under
which circumstances exist that may excuse a violation or at the least, under which
violations/exceptions occur despite the absolute ban. In assessing the arguments below, I focus
on the former and conclude that the rhetorical absolute ban is undesirable; torture is appropriate
in certain well-defined circumstances.
A.
25
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i. Philosophical argument
Rule absolutists typically apply the deontological view that torture is intrinsically
wrong.26 Under this way of thinking, torture violates the physical and mental integrity of the
recipient and removes his or her freedom.27 Torture as a result is an evil that can never be
justified or allowed morally or legally. Absolutists, if following their cause, must believe that
they cannot torture an individual even when violating the prohibition on torture might prevent
innocent people from being tortured.
With a similar outcome, rule-consequentialists support strict application of the ban in all
circumstances. In rule-consequentialist moral theories, we ought to follow the rule strictly
because in the end it leads to a better result.28 Therefore, when confronted with a particular case,
the ticking bomb, for example, decision makers should ignore the results of a cost benefit
analysis in that particular case and strictly follow the rule as adopted.29 But such rigid adherence
to a rule could also be described as irrational because its proponents would favor abstract
conformity to the rule and the idea of probable long term good that seems divorced from reality
over the more concrete human suffering that could be avoided in the ticking bomb situation.
Such a person might respond by arguing that people are frequently mistaken in assessing the
extremity of the situation, so strict adherence to the rule is appropriate because it incorporates
this likelihood of mistake. This chance of mistake, however, can be minimized with proper
procedures.
26
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Proponents of the rhetorical absolute ban on torture reason that the ban is designed to
prevent pain, violence and death.30 This reasoning, however, also serves to undermine the
institution of an absolute ban when one considers the situation in which an authority would want
to employ torture as a preventive interrogation technique. A government would do so only in an
effort to avoid a greater harm of the exact kind that is sought to be avoided by the strict
adherence to the ban on torture.31
On the other hand, proponents of allowing torture in certain circumstances often justify
their belief with act-consequentialist type reasoning. This is a utilitarian approach to the problem
and it leads to the following: given the costs and benefits in a particular situation, the benefits of
torture may exceed the costs.32 The argument against act-consequentialists is that it leads to too
much torture.33 That is, since such reasoning has no built in boundaries the use of torture is
decided on a case-by-case analysis weighing the benefits against the costs. There is a need to
impose some limitations. Another critique leveled at this justification for an incomplete ban on
torture is that those making the weighing will tend to be biased towards the immediate and may
discount the long-term consequences. That is, authorities will consider the imminent threat to
the masses and heavily discount, or ignore altogether, the long-term detrimental effects of
allowing torture to be used in the particular case. The critique contends that we need absolute
rules to control us in times of emergency when we may not be thinking clearly.
30
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Oren Gross argued that the problem is that since both pure philosophical perspectives
make sense, neither prevails and they are mutually exclusive.34 However, it seems that the
critiques of the act-consequentialist justification could be offset by the imposition of rigorous
procedures designed as strict limitations on the use of torture while the critiques of the absolutist
arguments are immutable, inherent to their philosophical reasoning and thus irremediable.
ii. The importance of setting a strong moral standard
A convincing argument supporting an absolute ban has been made by those that tout the
importance of setting a moral standard. Maintaining a strong commitment to an absolute ban on
torture allows the United States to differentiate itself from the terrorists and to maintain that it is
on the moral high ground.35 Indeed, creating and adhering to an absolute ban on torture sends a
strong anti-torture message to the international community.36
Richard Posner argues forcefully that this proposition is incorrect; he notes that recently
France, the United Kingdom and Israel have all “used torture to extract information, yet none is a
country that has sunk into barbarism.”37 He maintains that while torture is uncivilized, civilized
nations have engaged in torture without becoming uncivilized.38 Moreover, it is not necessarily
clear that an explicit acknowledgement of its use coupled with efforts to limit that use sends a
34

Id. at 1490.

35

Oren Gross, supra note 10, at 1505.

36

Id. Legitimating the use of torture would constitute an important symbolic setback in the

campaign for human rights. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 6, at 145.
37

Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism and Interrogation in TORTURE: A COLLECTION

(Sanford Levinson ed., 2004), 291, 294 (internal quotations omitted).
38

Posner, supra note 37, at 294-95.

12

worse moral message than the status quo in which one could argue that the United States
knowingly ignores and intentionally circumvents an absolute prohibition.
Proponents of an absolute ban have also argued that allowing torture will fail to
encourage people to adhere to a morally appropriate line by suggesting that it is legal to stray
from that line.39 However, as Adam Raviv points out, this logic ignores the purpose of legal
rules that would permit officials to engage in torture. The ideal rule would allow torture only in
the rarest circumstance, so it is ineffective “to argue that people’s moral compasses will truly be
damaged if torture is prohibited 99.9% of the time rather than 100%.”40 He astutely continues,
“[j]ust because certain human rights norms are not absolute priorities of the state does not mean
that the state has entirely lost respect for them.”41 For example, just as Americans have not lost
respect for the right to freedom and self-determination in the face of a criminal justice system
that takes that right from individuals in certain circumstances, they will not lose respect for the
right to be free from torture if it is allowed in certain circumstances.
iii. Uncertainty in the merits of the hypothetical ticking bomb and the
effectiveness of torture as an interrogation technique
The absolute ban on torture is premised on traditional thinking that suggests that the
ticking bomb scenario is the outlandish fodder of academic debate and not fodder for principled
practical law making. That is, maybe the ticking bomb hypothetical is so unlikely that it should
remain in the classroom because the pure exception will so rarely be needed that the risk of
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opening the door to torture outweighs the potential benefit that may occur in the rarest
hypothetical circumstance hatched in the classroom and not in the courtroom or reality.
It should not, however, be ignored in the modern world where its occurrence seems more
likely. In light of the attacks on September 11, 2001, and others in Europe and elsewhere, this
type of extreme situation should not be brushed aside as merely “hypothetical, or as morally or
legally irrelevant.”42 For example, like any terrorist attack, the recent hotel bombings in Jordan
forcefully drive home this point; that is, growing numbers of attacks increase the likelihood that
a situation will occur in which preventive torture represents the only effective way of saving
innocent lives. The original and broader ticking bomb hypothetical should not be ignored as
simply “unlikely” to occur.
Furthermore, some argue that the hypothetical itself, when placed in a real world context,
has many holes. They ask: how certain could the police be that the person actually knows about
the bomb? How certain could the police be that the bomb actually exists or that torture is the
only way to go or that torture will even work at all?43 Just because there are problems with the
extreme situation does not mean it should be ignored when we establish rules. These are less
“problems” with the hypothetical that require its elimination and more additional elements that
need to be considered and incorporated into the hypothetical.
Absolutists level additional charges of uncertainty and ineffectiveness at the idea of
sanctioned torture.44 We do not know for sure that torture in a specific situation will result in the
42
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information necessary to prevent a terrorist attack from occurring. Furthermore, we cannot be
sure that a specific torture technique will even elicit the desired information. As above, these
problems should not be grounds for taking torture off the table; the uncertainties must be
considered. Therefore, we weigh the uncertainty in the effectiveness of the torture against the
risk to innocent lives—the benefit in the chance of preventing loss of innocent life may still
exceed the cost associated with the risk of torturing a possibly innocent person.45 Moreover, the
reality is that torture sometimes works; indeed, Alan Dershowitz has noted “that there are
numerous instances in which torture has produced self-proving, truthful information that was
necessary to prevent harm to civilians.”46 While it does not always work, it sometimes does; this
is why torture still exists in many parts of the world.47
iv. Slippery slope argument
Slippery slope proponents are quick to suggest that once we allow state torture in some
circumstances those circumstances will likely expand beyond the original intent. This slippery
slope could include (1) the use of torture in non-preventive interrogational situations, (2) the use
of torture in less than the most extreme situations, and (3) the use of torture in situations beyond
real terrorism.48 The only real slippery slope risk is in (2) because the others can more easily be
prevented by, for example, clearly defining what is a preventive interrogation situation—the line
between it and torture to punish and torture to elicit confessions would be easy to draw by
analyzing the degree to which a future harm was perceived and addressed through the torture. In
45
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response to the slippery slope, Dershowitz argues that it is only an argument of caution since
every compromise with an absolutist approach to human rights carries with it the risk of slipping
further.49
Furthermore, if we assume that preventive interrogation torture is effective in avoiding
loss of innocent life there will be an incentive for authority figures (1) to become more
dependant on it, and (2) to apply it to cases that are less extreme than the original catastrophic
situation.50 The risk of this ‘slip’ can be mitigated by imposing strict penalties for those that
cross the line by torturing in inappropriate situations coupled with instituting a rigorous method
for determining whether a situation is extreme enough to allow for torture.
B.

Arguments Supporting The Use Of Torture to Prevent Future Harm

The use of preventive interrogational torture is inevitable in certain circumstances.51
Accepting that fact means that rational governments will engage in torture when the
circumstances are the most extreme regardless of the legality of their decision. That
governments will do it regardless of its legality, however, is not necessarily a justification for
making it legal. Applying an absolute rule against torture, however, which itself exists on a
spectrum of interrogational behavior, is a misuse of the word absolute. It merely shifts the
ability to allow for exceptions one step up the chain from occurring during the application of the
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rule to the decision whether to apply the rule at all. In addition, the use of torture in spite of an
absolute ban impairs the idea of the Rule of Law.
i. Traditional justification arguments
The doctrine of necessity offers a reason for softening the absolute prohibition on torture
in the context of preventive interrogation. The existence of necessity as a defense demonstrates a
utilitarian bent to our construction and application of our laws. In analyzing torture, the
applicability of the defense of necessity to the ticking bomb situation suggests that the rhetorical
absolute ban should not exist. The necessity defense governs the situation “in which a person
commits an offense, but, from a social and moral point of view, it is undesirable that criminal
liability be imposed on him.”52 The absolute applicability of the necessity defense is well
established in the United States where we allow it to justify the commission of a wrong. “The
Model Code rejects any limitations on necessity cast in terms of particular evils to be avoided or
particular evils to be justified.”53 The code “reflects the view that the principle of necessity is
one of general validity.”54 As a result, torture seems to fall within the justification’s broad ambit.
Applying the traditional elements of the necessity defense suggests that it would justify
torture in the extreme situations and, importantly, fail to justify it in less extreme situations. The
elements of a necessity defense include:
1.

The harm to be averted must be imminent.

2.

The act charged must have been done to prevent a significant evil.

52
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3.

There must be a causal relationship between the criminal conduct and the harm to
be averted.

4.

There must have been no adequate alternative.

5.

The harm caused must not have been disproportionate to the harm avoided.

In applying the necessity rule to the ticking bomb hypothetical (used as an example of the
type of situation in which torture could plausibly be employed) we find a rough fit. First, in the
ticking bomb hypothetical the harm to innocent lives is, as discussed above, defined as
imminent. That imminence, however, many not rise to the level required by the necessity
defense. The ticking bomb may be imminent in that it refers to a sense of urgency under which
time constraints prohibit the application of other investigative techniques. This definition of
imminence directly ties to the fourth prong of the necessity defense outlined above. Second,
preventive interrogational torture prevents harm to innocent individuals. Thus, the second prong
appears to be satisfied.
Third, the causal relationship prong applies less clearly. We must ask: does the torture
cause the attack to be prevented? Is that an ex ante or ex post determination? It seems that the
nexus between torture and stopping the bomb must be a close one. Ordinarily, the volitional
illegal act alone abates the evil. Torture, however, is different because intervening events must
occur—merely gathering information does not stop the bomb. Two intervening events must
occur: (1) the torture victim must actually have and provide the information, and (2) the police
must then use that information to stop the bomb. As a result, this situation is between traditional
necessity cases and non-necessity cases. It is less direct than the act of breaking into a mountain
cabin during a storm to avoid losing a limb to frostbite (a traditional example of necessity) but
more direct than mere civil disobedience where the harm can only be averted by the act of
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another (a situation in which necessity does not exist). In the preventive interrogation case, by
viewing the police as a whole, it seems that the further step (actually getting the bomb) is not
indirect, as it is, in effect, taken by the same party that tortured.
Fourth, the law implies a reasonableness requirement in judging whether alternatives
exist. As a result, in an emergency situation in which the harm rises to the appropriate level of
imminence it might not be reasonable to pursue other investigative techniques. Fifth, and finally,
the ticking bomb situation, from a utilitarian perspective, clearly satisfies the balancing of the
harms requirement since the harm in death to many exceeds the harm in torture to one.
Given that necessity may represent an adequate defense to murder, it seems that an even
stronger case can be made that necessity can be a defense to torture. In The Queen v. Dudley
and Stephens,55 a storm caused the occupants of a ship to use an emergency boat belonging to the
ship. Afloat for at least 18 days and out of food, the adult occupants killed an innocent boy and
ate him so that they could survive. The court found the necessity defense unavailing for the
survivors. The judge supported the decision not to apply the defense by noting the problems
with its application: how could the harms be balanced, who would measure the value of the
individuals’ lives? The boy was an innocent. Moreover, the others chose him because of his
weakness. The judge reasoned that if necessity were applicable then the weaker physically will
always be sacrificed in that situation. The judge continued finding that no principled reason
suggests that the stronger is more valuable than the weaker. The use of torture, however, can be
distinguished from this case where necessity failed to justify the murder of the boy. Unlike the
life raft situation, with preventive torture the criminal act sought to be justified is not as serious
as death. While we know the innocence of the boy, authorities must have some degree of cause
55
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to believe that the torture victim is not. This mitigation of the problems discussed by the court in
the lifeboat case suggests that the necessity defense is stronger in the torture case.
The Model Penal Code lends itself to justifying the use of necessity to allow for torture.
The comment to the Code suggests that taking an innocent human life might be justified if a
greater number of lives may be saved by the taking of the one life.56 The reasoning supporting
the use of necessity in defense to murder provides several reasons to support the use of torture in
certain circumstances because the balancing of the harms is easier. While the commentaries
support necessity as a justification for the murder of an innocent person, in preventive
interrogation the victim is not innocent. More importantly, with interrogational torture the
victim is not killed to save others, just pained. The balance of the harms weighs heavily in favor
of allowing torture when contrasted with the commentary’s discussion of the legality in taking an
innocent person’s life to save others.
The law has extended the justification reasoning behind necessity to allow the defense of
others to justify murder. This justification supports murder whereas here torture is the extent of
the harm. While such a defense used to apply only where the defendant had a special
relationship with the potential victim of the murdered person, it now extends without regard to
such requirements. Killing in the defense of others is justified if the defendant honestly and
reasonably believed that the other’s life was in imminent unlawful danger or there was an
unlawful threat of serious bodily harm. This reasonableness element helps ameliorate some of
the problems discussed above and associated generally with the necessity defense. In the
defense of others context, we allow a necessity defense even though we know that some people
56

American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Comment to § 3.02 at 14-15

(1985).

20

will have reasonable, but ultimately incorrect, beliefs. Similarly, torture to prevent future harm
to others should be allowed where authorities have reason to believe that innocent lives are in
unlawful danger—as long as we can ensure that the belief will be correct with regularity.
ii. Other reasons
Generally, seemingly absolute rules do not exist because exceptions abound. Moreover,
the mere existence of exceptions to other rules does not swallow nor negate the sanctity of the
rule to which they apply. For example, murder is illegal, however, there are many situations in
which the crime of murder can be committed but where an exception to the rule allows the actor
to avoid punishment.
Torture as a means to conduct preventive interrogation should not be subject to an
absolute ban because the behavior and actions governed by true absolute bans (with no
exceptions) differ from torture to prevent a terrorist attack. The absolute prohibitions against
slavery and genocide are principles commonly asserted as jus cogens norms. The use of torture
to prevent future harms differs in several fundamental ways from genocide and slavery. On the
one hand, no reasonable justifications exist to support slavery or genocide—so an absolute is
appropriate and sustainable.57 There are few if any hypotheticals worthy of intellectual debate in
which genocide or slavery would be appropriate or justified. In stark contrast, such hypotheticals
exist for the use of torture to prevent future harm. Indeed, there are moral, ethical, political and
legal arguments that support the use of torture in certain circumstances. The differences suggest
57
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that torture in preventive interrogation should not be flatly prohibited in the same way that
slavery and genocide are.
Judith Jarvis Thomson provides some evidence of the extent to which torture is an option
desired by most in her Trolley Problem.58 In this situation, a trolley car is barreling down its
track.59 The track splits and if it stays on its current course the trolley will strike and kill five
people standing on the track and if its track is shifted, it will strike and kill one person.60 The
question is would a person able to switch the trolley as it approaches be justified in flipping the
switch and sentencing the single individual to death to save the other five?61 Thomson found
that everybody to whom she proposed this hypothetical said the person would be justified in
flipping the switch.62 There, the innocent life was sacrificed whereas in the torture situation the
individual would be neither killed nor innocent; therefore, it makes sense that torture would
receive the same overwhelming approval in a similar situation.
Furthermore, the very fact that most countries seem to conduct torture while purporting to
adhere to the absolute ban suggests that the rhetorical 100% absolute ban is inappropriate and
undesired. It seems fairly widely accepted that even countries that have signed the CAT and
publicly condemned torture have not strictly adhered to an absolute ban.63 Indeed, it seems that
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not only is it sometimes practiced but it also has been successful in preventing acts of
terrorism.64 Where an absolute ban is ignored by utilitarian leaders in circumstances favoring
doing so, it seems inappropriate to cling to it for the sake of theory and philosophy. It also seems
clear given the Trolley problem’s results that few would actually vote for a leader who followed
absolutist views to their extreme at the cost of innocent lives. Indeed, Richard Posner has argued
that no one who doubts that torture is permissible if the circumstances are extreme enough
should be in a position of responsibility.65
III.

Avenues to Travel in Allowing Torture: Creating the Proper ‘Amount’ of Torture
The idea of a theoretical absolute ban against torture in which no exceptions can exist

does not seem appropriate or feasible in light of history and the circumstances discussed above.
Logically, this means that some torture should be allowed. Now the question is what system
leads to the ideal or appropriate amount of torture? Accepting that torture cannot actually be
absolutely prevented requires an analysis of the possible ways of handling torture to limit it to
essential circumstances. It is important to emphasize, however, that in seeking to discover or to
create an appropriate system for regulating torture we do not seek an absolute answer as exists
for, say, the shortest distance between two points—a line. Instead, regulation of torture
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necessarily requires a balancing of evils and even the best regulation might not be ‘good’; it may
merely be the least evil.
Two elements must be satisfied by a proper regulation of torture. First, the system should
allow for “appropriate” torture. Appropriate, in this situation, has two distinct meanings.
Appropriate torture refers to the use of torture only in the extreme cases where utilitarian based
justification arguments apply; this limits the scope of situations (and thereby the quantity) in
which torture can be employed. Appropriate torture also refers to the use of torture techniques
that avoid grossly ignoring human rights; this limits the types of torture that could be employed.
Limiting the types of torture, while not in line with a strict application of utilitarian thinking,
would serve to minimize the damage to the benefit of setting a moral standard for the
international community and to ensure an appropriate degree of human rights and dignity. Such
a limitation would also ensure a degree of reasonableness in torture, ensuring that the minimum
degree of torture is used to elicit the necessary information—i.e. there is no need to destroy 10
buildings to stop the spread of a fire when the destruction of one building will suffice. Such a
limitation also acknowledges the uncertainties inherent in torturing as it limits the potential harm
to the torturee by fixing a cost (extreme torture techniques) that the benefit (preventing harm)
cannot exceed. Second, the system should preserve the Rule of Law by avoiding rampant
exceptions and other forms of non-application of a governing law.
A.

Torture Warrants

Alan Dershowitz argues that torture, if allowed, should be conducted overtly to promote
regulation and limitation of its practice. The goal of his controversial Torture Warrant is “to
reduce the use of torture to the smallest amount and degree possible.”66 The Torture Warrant
66
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system represents an effort to maximize civil liberties in light of the probability that torture will
otherwise be employed covertly.67 It is better for torture to be known and discussed so that
practitioners can be held accountable and to strict standards. Torture Warrants arguably satisfy
both elements of the ideal or proper regulation of torture: the appropriate level and the support of
the Rule of Law.
The use of Torture Warrants could help ensure that the torture that is practiced meets the
appropriateness requirements of a proper torture regulatory system. First, it could do so because
Torture Warrants work to ensure accountability. Dershowitz argues that a formal, visible,
system is easier to control than a system that promotes or allows for secrecy.68 Torture Warrants
represent a system in which torture would be conducted openly and in accordance with
established legal procedure. In addition, to ensure accountability any alleged torturee could be
provided a cause of action against the government. The use of torture is something for which we
would want to facilitate civilian involvement in ensuring compliance with requirements.
Second, requiring a Torture Warrant could limit the situations in which torture is used by
explicitly ensuring that it is only used as a last resort. Such a system would do so by requiring
applicants to demonstrate that other methods have proven ineffective or are not feasible.
Third, a Torture Warrant may also reduce the use of torture because a potential torturee,
knowing that the law authorized the threat of torture, might be more willing to provide the
needed information.69 A potential torturee, without being presented a Torture Warrant, might
believe that an interrogator’s threat to use torture is empty, that they would not actually torture
67
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because they are limited by a lack of authority or will to engage in such practices. Such a person
might withhold information based on that belief until that belief is negated by actual torture. By
contrast, a Torture Warrant might convince the potential torturee that torture will be used, thus
increasing the likelihood that the torturee will provide the information to avoid certain torture.
A Torture Warrant system might limit the harshness of the type of torture applied because
such a system may counter the fact that the utilitarian justification alone has no inherent limiting
principle; that is, if a simple cost benefit analysis is applied the torture techniques could be as
extreme as necessary. A Torture Warrant could limit this by building in principled barriers that
cannot be crossed, for example by requiring that the torture conducted result in no long-term
effects on the torturee or that a medical professional be present.
Creation of a Torture Warrant system succeeds in supporting the Rule of Law where
other torture regulation systems fail. Dershowitz states, correctly, that if torture is necessary in a
certain case, then our laws must accommodate the practice.70 Moreover, given that a vast
majority of individuals support the use of non-lethal torture in an extreme case,71 it is appropriate
for the law to consider and incorporate that reality. A Torture Warrant system recognizes that in
reality leaders will engage in torture whether or not it is explicitly and absolutely banned,
represents an acceptance of that fact and works with the probability of exceptions to an absolute
rule to limit those exceptions explicitly. Such a system, by acknowledging that torture will be
used, and building in limited exceptions, ensures that all actions that violate the law will be
punished rather than allowing some violations to go unpunished.
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Dershowitz’s Torture Warrants have been challenged on several fronts. Posner has
suggested that a judicial screen would serve little effect given Dershowitz’s distrust of judges’
competency and would merely cover questionable practices with the misleading imprimatur of
judicial approval.72 This attack misses the target, however, as an analysis by a judge or
magistrate layered on top of an investigation by the warrant applicant would be better than
trusting the competency of just an official or officer, as under the current system. Moreover,
Posner admits that such a requirement would “no doubt make the officers seeking [Torture
Warrants] a little more careful”73 and this care would certainly limit the use of torture more than
having no such requirement. To counter allegations that judges will become mere rubber stamps
for Torture Warrants such a system could also require that such decisions be made publicly
available with written decisions and that the proposed torturee be in the courtroom so that the
judge or magistrate cannot escape into “abstraction.”74
B.

Other Options
i. Maintaining the status quo

Accepting the notion that leaders will allow torture to occur in the extreme situation does
not necessarily require a change in the current treatment of torture. The current system may in
fact lead to the proper amount of torture. Maintaining the status quo, however, does not appear
to do so because it fails to achieve both elements of a proper regulation of torture,
appropriateness and preservation of the Rule of Law.
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Proponents of the status quo argue that current legal prohibitions should continue to
regulate torture, with the understanding that they will not be enforced in certain circumstances.75
Richard Posner suggests that the illegality of their actions will give leaders pause and reduce the
danger of a ratchet effect by which restrictions of civil liberties in emergencies would continue
after the end of the emergency.76 Afterwards, the torturers would maintain that they do not use
torture. In this circumstance, the responsibility for torture would, theoretically, be relegated to
the political realm.
The status quo has received some support because it seems to meet the first prong of an
ideal torture regulatory system. That is, proponents argue that under the current system, the
occurrences are limited and as a result, the torture allowed may be the appropriate quantity. This
is a superficial justification that overlooks the fact that the current system allows infractions to
remain hidden which increases the risk of inappropriate torture methods and reduces
accountability.
An essential problem with the current system is that it reduces accountability. With a
lack of accountability, few can be punished for their violation of the absolute ban. The inability
to punish allows torturers to ignore the deterrent effect that punishment would have on the scope
of their torture. Moreover, accountability is an important value in a democracy.77 Indeed,
Dershowitz stated that “off-the-book actions below the radar screen are antithetical to the theory
and practice of democracy” because “[c]itizens cannot approve or disapprove of governmental
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actions of which they are unaware.”78 If such torture were overt, it could be more easily limited
by disapproval of torture in inappropriate situations. Unofficial, hidden exceptions should not be
tolerated because they cannot be adequately regulated. We should not let such a serious
infringement of human rights to continue to occur under the radar.
For example, one way that the United States has conducted torture under the current
system is to export suspected terrorists to other nations that more freely engage in torture-type
activities.79 Ignoring the obvious timing problem (shipping them to a foreign country might
negate the ability to prevent an extreme ticking bomb emergency), the secrecy with which this is
done is problematic. First, we do not know how often and under what circumstances or
conditions the United States is doing this. Second, as Adam Raviv accurately noted, sending
suspects to other nations with the only instruction being “we need to know X and we don’t care
how you get it” will almost inevitably ensure that excessive abuse, beyond that which would be
necessary, will ensue.80 Even if we instruct the other nation to act in good faith or within reason,
the only party that will actually know what happened will be the torturer who has little incentive
to be forthcoming and the torturee who can likely effectively be marginalized.81 Moreover, the
interrogator charged with eliciting the information in a nation that allows torture will have
incentives, pleasing the United States, which will encourage him or her to go beyond that which
is necessary or reasonable to extract the information.82
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Accountability and its deterrent effects are reduced in two other ways by this straw-man
system of torture. First, the torturing nation would not receive the proper disincentive because if
it provides the U.S. government with the information that it wants, the risk of retribution or
reprisal should the atrocities become public would be slim since any reaction by the U.S. would
likely just be a ploy to placate the international community.83 Second, the U.S. would not be
held accountable because officials could argue that a ‘rogue’ interrogator conducted the torture
and that the United States did not encourage or foresee such actions. That is, the U.S. would not
be forced to rethink its actions in the future because its complicity would be mitigated by merely
voicing its disapproval. This method of conducting torture clearly undermines the elements of
appropriate torture.
In a related circumstance, we need only look to the United States’ experience with
interrogations to see that merely stating the illegality of certain interrogatory actions will not
serve to limit them. In the context of police interrogations and protecting the right against selfincrimination, the Supreme Court grew dissatisfied with its test under the Due Process clause
under which confessions are excluded if “involuntary.” Given the serious nature of the rights
infringed and the methods used, the Court recognized a need for procedural safeguards to protect
the right against self-incrimination and as a result adopted the Miranda warnings as a specific
safeguard to ensure against coercion.84 While the Miranda rules have been subjected to
numerous manipulations, the Supreme Court has reasoned that having the procedures is better
than not having them.
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In addition, the absolute ban on torture coupled with selective enforcement should be
avoided because having an absolute ban that is ignored in certain circumstances undermines the
Rule of Law. To call a ban absolute but then ignore it when appropriate reduces the law to
rhetoric. Therefore, if we know beforehand that there will be exceptions that will be tolerated,
the rule itself or system of regulation should acknowledge and allow for the exception.85 The
citizens in a democracy governed by the Rule of Law should never want its leaders to act
illegally.86
Accepting the notion that leaders will allow torture to occur in the extreme situation does
not necessarily require a change in the current treatment of torture. However, as discussed
above, the current system fails to achieve both elements of a proper regulation of torture. Any
claim that torture must be secret to be effective is outweighed by those failures. The inherent
uncertainty associated with torture coupled with the problems of accountability, the difficulty in
assuring the appropriate level of torture and the harm to the Rule of Law caused by its disregard
suggest that if secrecy is required then torture should never be employed because it would not
survive a full cost-benefit analysis that incorporated those uncertainties. The current absolute
ban should be lifted in favor of a strict ban that explicitly allows for torture in certain emergency
situations akin to the ticking bomb situation.
ii. Official Disobedience
Oren Gross advocates for a similar standard that he calls Official Disobedience. In this
system of regulation the absolute ban on torture is maintained in general circumstances but the
truly exceptional cases might cause official disobedience in which public officials act outside of
85
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the law but must be ready to accept the consequences of their actions.87 This argument seems to
center on the notion that while torture cannot be prevented completely, the absolute ban could
result in the proper limitation of its use. This argument is that the absolute ban in conjunction
with public approval/disapproval will achieve the desired result, i.e. appropriate torture. Gross
argues that in the ticking bomb case the appropriate response might be to go outside of the law
and even violate accepted constitutional principles.88
While Gross’ official disobedience focuses on the absolute nature of the ban, it allows for
an official who violates the ban to escape sanctions in certain exceptional circumstances.89 This
construction renders the term ‘absolute’ a nullity--for what is an absolute rule if you can violate
it and not be punished? By allowing officials to avoid punishment in certain circumstances,
official disobedience also begs the question: who should determine whether the circumstances
are exceptional or not? Gross offers that society retains the role of making the ultimate
determination whether the actor should be punished or rewarded.90 He states that the “people
may decide to hold the actor accountable for the wrongfulness of her actions, or may approve
them retrospectively.”91 But this begs another question: what standards will be used for
determining these exceptional circumstances? Just politics?
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The decision to torture may result in several outcomes: punishment, reward or ratification
of the decision to torture.92 The results are based on society’s decision that the acts were either
unjustified and subject to punishment or valid and subject to ratification. Society has too many
facets and not all may agree. For example, Gross offers that ratification could come from a
prosecutorial decision not to bring criminal charges.93 Another ratification could be reelection.
What if the public supports the decision but the prosecutor or official with the power to pardon
follows the absolutist line of thinking? Moreover, when you consider the historic effect of “we”
versus “they” thinking, the public, without having to follow any rigid standard, will be more
willing to ratify torture conducted by an American official, a member of the “we” group, against
an alleged terrorist, a member of the “they” group.
He suggests that ex post ratification by ‘society’ encourages and emphasizes government
accountability94 because “public officials have no one to hide behind.”95 Gross, however, does
not address the means by which the torture will become known nor how it will ensure
accountability. Gross fails to address the likelihood that the president or leader will not stand
trial or be named responsible for this or that decision to torture—there will likely be a ‘fall’ guy.
Furthermore, an ex post ratification by society without standards will allow the success or failure
of the decision to torture to influence the decision to ratify or not ratify its use. Society will be
far more likely to approve of the decision to torture if the government can demonstrate that its
92
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actions saved lives by preventing a terrorist attack. Indeed, faced with public support, most
elected representatives would overlook the unreasonableness of the decision to torture in a given
case in favor of carrying out the public’s demand.96 On the other hand, an ex ante decision by
the courts is more appropriate because that would minimize the risk of bias. Indeed, even an ex
post decision by the courts would be better because judges are far better equipped and, more
importantly, experienced to make such difficult after-the-fact determinations.97
Gross separates the general case from the catastrophic case, but that just hides the
question and confuses the analysis.98 He correctly notes that the general (i.e. non-catastrophic)
situation should be governed by an absolute ban on torture.99 He then says that the catastrophic
situation should be addressed, seemingly, separately.100 But by separating the catastrophic
situation and suggesting an after-the-fact determination of its character, he ignores the very
difficulty in assessing when a situation is catastrophic enough. The question is, what is a
catastrophic case; how do we assess it and how do we ensure that it is the only situation in which
torture is used. In reality, there is a spectrum of situations with catastrophic at one end and it
makes little sense to apply an absolute rule to part of the spectrum and another rule to another.
One rule should govern all circumstances.
It seems obvious that the removal of the absolute ban will harm the image of the U.S. in
the rest of the world. Gross argues, correctly, that consideration of international opinion
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increases the costs of acting illegally and as a result is a disincentive to engage in torture.101 But
if torture is inevitable then by committing to a policy of official disobedience we are
guaranteeing that a leader will frustrate the international community by acting outside the law.
Moreover, applying Gross’ idea, we would again draw the international community’s ire if we
allowed a leader to violate the ban and then our public chose not to punish. This is a bigger
problem than the absolute rule because in that case, at least, there are no exceptions. What
message does it send if our leaders can violate the law but are not punished? If we are not going
to punish then it should not be a crime. So to avoid this possible outcome government will likely
just continue to keep the violations secret, negating the argument that ex post ratification will
result in openness—what incentive would there be to be forthcoming about torture?
In justifying his approach, Gross separates the notion of rule departure from the
punishment for that violation.102 I would argue that it is more important not to have exceptions
to the punishment than not to have exceptions to the violation of the rule. Allowing violations of
the absolute ban to go unpunished at the whim of the public undermines long-term notions of the
importance and sanctity of the Rule of Law by reducing it to mere rhetoric. Gross’ Official
Disobedience is subject to the same Rule of Law arguments that militated against maintaining
the status quo.103
iii. Allow torturers to plead the Law of Necessity or Self-Defense
Some proponents of institutionalizing torture have argued that the status quo should be
maintained but that the necessity defense should be explicitly accepted as a viable justification
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for the use of torture.104 Such legitimization has several flaws. It does not necessarily facilitate a
reduction in torture to an appropriate amount. Allowing the necessity defense may not serve to
create the same level of accountability that the Torture Warrants will allow because it does not
create a system that promotes publicity. In addition, it does not provide the separation and
additional level of consideration that a judge’s analysis would have. Instead, it falls victim to
many of the pitfalls that plague Gross’ Official Disobedience. Such an after-the-fact analysis of
the decision to torture will likely become intertwined with the ultimate outcome of the decision.
It seems unlikely that a jury would convict a person whose decision rested on weak evidence but
resulted in the prevention of a terrorist attack that would have killed thousands. Even if this
likelihood is abated by prohibiting evidence of events which occur after the torture occurs,
another type of jury bias is relevant and remains problematic. It seems reasonable to assume that
a torturee will often be of Arab descent, therefore it stands to reason that an American jury might
be more apt to believe the U.S. official’s claim that they had the requisite belief to satisfy the
necessity defense—this would be a classic instance of the oft-mentioned ‘we’ versus ‘they’ bias.
Many elements of the principles underlying the necessity defense are already
incorporated into the Torture Warrant concept. The Torture Warrant is designed to limit torture
to those situations in which it is the only means practically available and when the benefit
seemingly greatly outweighs the harm—elements which seem to mirror the necessity elements.
Moreover, an emergency exception to the Torture Warrant requirement will rely on necessity
type arguments. As a result, Torture Warrants incorporate, to some extent, the principles
underlying the necessity defense, but the warrant would also serve to formalize the application of
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the defense and add an element of prior approval thus making it more difficult to get away with
torture.
IV.

Creating the Torture Warrant
Creation of the Torture Warrant in the United States105 requires the satisfaction of two

elements. First, torture as a means of preventive interrogation must be allowed under the
Constitution. Second, the Torture Warrant must be created and justified by more than the
practical considerations discussed above.
A.

The Constitutionality of Torture Warrants
i. The Constitutionality of preventive interrogation torture

In the United States allowing a torture exception in the preventive interrogation situation
would not run headlong into the long-standing Supreme Court precedent against the use of
torture because the situations in which it would be appropriate can be distinguished from those
prior cases. In addition, preventive torture could be appropriately tailored to achieve the
government’s interest in protecting its citizens.
Torture as a means to prevent future harm can be distinguished from the situations in
which the Supreme Court has already ruled on the use of torture or related conduct. The Court’s
ruling in Brown v. Mississippi has made it an unconstitutional Fifth Amendment Due Process
violation to elicit a confession through torture.106 While interrogation to elicit a confession looks
to the past, interrogation to elicit information to prevent a terrorist attack looks to the future. As
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a result, the latter, if done successfully, can prevent the loss of innocent life. In contrast, the
former serves merely to uncover what has already happened and to help effect punishment.
These differences suggest that the Brown v. Mississippi holding could be limited to eliciting
confessions that seek to uncover the past and that a different standard should apply to forwardlooking preventive interrogation. In addition, the Fifth Amendment refers only to selfincrimination at a trial, which does not occur if the information is not used in a trial against the
torturee. Moreover, preventive interrogation does not influence the right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment because that has been interpreted to apply
only to punishment after conviction.107 Here, by contrast, we are concerned with pre-conviction
torture that is not intended to punish.
The use of torture in particular circumstances likely does not violate established Fifth
Amendment substantive Due Process jurisprudence. Torture represents an invasion of a person’s
bodily integrity and such violations represent an invasion of the Fifth Amendment’s Liberty
interest. As such, torture may only be used if it is narrowly tailored to a compelling government
interest.108 It is important to note that torture to punish and torture to elicit a confession could
fall into the same balancing test but in those cases the cost always outweighs the benefit.
Preventive interrogation torture would be narrowly tailored when appropriately limited. In
addition, the government has a compelling interest in preserving the lives of its citizens by
protecting them from a terrorist attack. That is, torture, under certain circumstances, meets strict
scrutiny standards. It is important to note, however, that the opposite is also true; preventive
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interrogation torture can fail to meet strict scrutiny standards. For example, the use of torture
would not meet strict scrutiny if it were used to break-up a terrorist cell that had no immediate
plan of action because such a use would be unjustified for the same reasons that incarceration is
unjustified where an alleged criminal’s actions fail to amount to an attempt. Moreover, such a
circumstance would clearly accentuate and exacerbate the problems with torture—if no attack is
yet planned, what information could the police believe the torturee has?
Given the seriousness of the harm imposed by the use of torture, Dershowitz’ notion of
Torture Warrants may represent the right course because its intent would be to ensure that the
use of torture in a specific case is narrowly tailored and that the end (the harm sought to be
avoided) is compelling.
ii. Possible Constitutional support for Torture Warrants
For a Torture Warrant to exist there must be both a source of that power and an absence
of contrary rights. First, it is appropriate to mention the methods by which a Torture Warrant
System could be established. One method would be the legislative creation of such a system. It
could also arise with the use of torture by the executive coupled with a judicial response that
could be the creation of Torture Warrants to limit the Due Process infringement. By recognizing
an interest in bodily integrity, the Supreme Court in fact has already provided an initial step
towards this. Justice O’Connor, in concurring in Cruzan, recognized an interest in the bodily
integrity of individuals by stating that “[b]ecause our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined
with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state
incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause.”
Torture would constitute a state incursion into the body repugnant to the Due Process clause but
maybe that repugnancy could be overcome and thus torture allowed under certain circumstances.
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The Due Process clause could require Torture Warrants because they could strike the balance
between the state’s interest in protecting its citizens and an individual’s right to bodily integrity.
With judicial reasoning not unlike that supporting the Miranda decision, it could be
argued that the serious nature and implications of using torture in interrogation require that a
Torture Warrant must be secured. There must be a test that the potential torturer must pass in
order to prove its case—that is, a test of what a compelling government interest is. The Torture
Warrant process could ensure that the government interest is compelling.
B.

Other Support for the Creation of Torture Warrants
i. Torture Warrants allow for the appropriate limitation of the use of torture
as a means to conduct preventive interrogation

Accepting the premise that exceptions to the absolute ban on torture should be made in
certain circumstances, it becomes necessary to assess the type of exception. Exceptions to a rule
come in two general categories: discretionary exceptions and categorical exceptions.
The first rule, as its name states, allows the judge or other person assessing the validity of
the rule wide latitude in any given case. As a simplistic example, you could argue that the rule
should be that torture should not be allowed unless it is 'really really' necessary. This rule
suggests a balancing test that attempts to construe the rule narrowly in an effort to limit
exceptions. But, so the slippery slope argument goes, this type of rule inherently allows for ever
wider interpretations that might allow the exceptions to grow and slide away from the original
intent to limit exceptions. Even a serious discretionary rule like that which could be extracted
from the constitutional test described above (paraphrased: Torture is valid if and only if the harm
to the person tortured is outweighed (or to limit it further, substantially outweighed) by a
compelling government interest). This discretionary Constitutional balancing test is subject to
the same slippery slope arguments. So how do we narrow it?
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We turn to the second type of exception, categorical exceptions to rules. This type of rule
seeks to eliminate the risk of increasing exceptions. Dershowitz’s Torture Warrants can do just
that--by explicitly establishing rules and requirements for such a warrant we limit the tendency
for the slippery slope to come true. The Court, for example, applied a more categorical rule by
creating the strict requirements of Miranda where the right infringed was too important for a
discretionary rule to govern. Similarly, in the torture context a warrant could establish
appropriate safeguards to ensure that torture is only used in limited circumstances. For example,
torture itself and the situations in which it is justified could be defined more concretely and
rigorously. Furthermore, the categorical nature of a Torture Warrant is not an absolute
categorical rule; it instead lends structure, the benefit of a categorical rule, certainty of
application, and judicial review and scrutiny to the torture arena.
ii. Practical Support for Torture Warrants
While a Torture Warrant is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or its
amendments, if we accept its constitutionality a Torture Warrant could be supported by
reasoning similar to that offered in favor of traditional warrants articulated in Johnson v. United
States. Traditional warrants protect people against an infringement of their constitutional rights
by regulating against unjustified searches and seizures; a Torture Warrant would protect a similar
constitutional right by regulating against unjustified harm to bodily integrity.109 A warrant
ensures that a disinterested party, a neutral third person, acts as a check against the officer’s
actions; this serves to reduce capricious behavior and to limit the risk of a rash decision.110 Just
as a traditional warrant limits the Fourth Amendment infringement by defining the scope of the
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search or seizure a Torture Warrant would limit the bodily integrity infringement by defining the
scope of the torture, including the methods that can be used and the information sought. In
addition, a warrant requirement forces officers to do their homework before they apply; in the
torture context, this would ensure that torture is done only when appropriate. The warrant
application allows for a record to be made and thus acts as a check on officers and allows the
magistrate to assess the level of cause based on one package.
C.

Creating a Proper Torture Warrant

For the Torture Warrant to be useful as anything more than an interesting thought
experiment the requirements for its issue need to be fully developed. The appropriate issuance of
a Torture Warrant should be governed by practical tests and balances that the court system can
apply with regularity and predictability. In response to the Dershowitz proposal Wayne Renke
outlined many of the questions that need to be answered before a Torture Warrant requirement
can be applied.111 These questions and others are discussed below.
i. Primary Issues Related to Securing Warrants
Similar to traditional warrants, a Torture Warrant should require that the potential torturer
demonstrate an appropriate level of cause112 to believe (1) that a crisis situation exists; and (2)
that the individual has vital knowledge that can be used to prevent that crisis. This is unlike a
traditional warrant where the crime has already happened and the cause is relevant to the
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particular person to be arrested or the place to be searched because here the analysis is bifurcated
into the likelihood that the crisis exists (since it has not yet happened) and the likelihood that the
individual has information. While some may argue that in the War on Terror we are in a
permanent state of crisis, but that merely conceals the test to be applied. The crisis situation
must be a situation beyond the current baseline or norm; even in the War on Terror there is not
an imminent attack all the time in which details of the attack are known.
First, each of the two parts of the bifurcated analysis must be fleshed out. As to the first
prong, demonstrating the existence of the crisis (crisis seems stronger than mere emergency)
requires that several questions be answered. What types of risks will be sufficient?113 How
many individuals must be at risk?114 How “imminent” must it be? Dershowitz would confine it
to the ticking bomb hypothetical.115 I would say that it should apply in the broader ticking bomb
scenarios in which alternative means of investigation are not applicable or will likely prove
futile. As to the second prong, the following question must be answered: what type of
information must the person allegedly have?116 It would seem that he or she would need to have
information that if known will directly lead to preventing a future harm.
Second, the level of cause that an officer must demonstrate for each prong must be
determined.117 In ordinary investigations the cause required to be demonstrated by an officer
varies with the seriousness of the right infringed. For example, no level of cause or suspicion is
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required for a mere encounter with the police because the Fourth Amendment is not implicated at
all.118 Moving down the line to more serious infringements, reasonable suspicion is required for
stops that do not rise to the level of an arrest and frisks that do not rise to the level of a fullblown Fourth Amendment search.119 This level of suspicion requires that the officer have a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.120 Finally, probable cause is required for the
more serious violations involved in searches and seizures.121 Probable cause is a still higher
threshold that requires that there be a fair probability that criminal activity was done or is being
done.122 Given that the right to bodily integrity upon which torture encroaches is more serious
than a search or seizure, in the case of torture the level of cause should be higher and the
evidence should be convincing.
Having provided a framework to think about the level of cause required, the question
remains unanswered: what level above probable cause is appropriate? Preponderance of the
Evidence? Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Since an encroachment on the right to bodily integrity
cannot be undone like a violation of the right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure (i.e.
by exclusion of the evidence or release from custody) a Torture Warrant should issue only when
there is at least a preponderance of the evidence, but given the severity of torture and the desire
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to limit its use, perhaps we should require clear and convincing evidence (the most cause short of
that necessary for criminal conviction). This would further serve to limit the application of
torture. While the level of cause required increases when moving from Terry Stops to official
arrests to torture, the level of cause required should not vary once the situation is in the Torture
Warrant bin because the level of cause required is related to the right involved not the ends for
which the right is inhibited.
ii. Secondary Issues Related to Obtaining Warrants
Once the requirements for the issuance of a Torture Warrant have been established, a host
of additional questions need to be answered. First, what sorts of torture can be employed?123 In
an effort to satisfy the second part of the appropriate torture requirement (type/severity) for
proper torture regulation, the Court should outline certain types of torture that can be employed
while maintaining that certain kinds of torture are still subject to the absolute ban. For example,
torture allowable under a Torture Warrant should be required to be (1) designed not to cause
permanent damage; and (2) undertaken in the presence of medical personnel. Second, what
should the penalty be for violating the warrant requirement? These limits serve to reduce the
damage to international reputation that allowing torture will cause and to ensure a limited
infringement of bodily integrity.
Third, and very importantly (especially in light of the already established traditional
warrant framework and the unique circumstances surrounding the ticking bomb hypothetical),
special care must be given and attention paid to the situation wherein there is no time to get a
warrant. Should there be an emergency exception as there is in the Fourth Amendment analysis?
To be clear, would there be an emergency exception to the Torture Warrant which itself only
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issues in an emergency situation? This seems like a bizarre exercise in redundancy. But the
reasoning behind the emergency exception to the warrant requirement would transfer to the
Torture Warrant context.124 However, since the Torture Warrant only occurs in emergency
situations the emergency exception would have to be correspondingly heightened. That is, since
the situations in which Torture Warrants will be issued will already be exceptional
circumstances, the whole warrant application process surrounding the Torture Warrant will be
shifted upstream towards emergency-- since a greater level of urgency than the traditional
warrant situation will be required to be shown for any issuance, a greater level of emergency in
the Torture Warrant situation will have to be shown as compared to the traditional emergency
requirement.
Given the unique degree of urgency required in the situations contemplated, it would
undermine the whole rule if an emergency exception were not allowed. A benefit of having the
Torture Warrant requirement is that it creates a rigorous structure for the ex post analysis
necessary where a Torture Warrant is not issued before a suspect is tortured. An officer or other
authority will have to prove that a Torture Warrant could not have been attained in time. That
proof required will parallel the quasi-necessity type arguments offered in the traditional warrant
arena and as such could be called a modified strict-justification test that would incorporate the
Torture Warrant requirements. The modified test that a torturer would need to satisfy would be
more rigorously and thoroughly laid out than the traditional justification analysis.
V.

Conclusion
Given the degree to which torture continues under the rhetorical absolute ban, it is likely

that the international community would not support a functioning truly absolute ban. Torture is,
124

Oren Gross, supra note 10, at 1538.

46

for better or worse, perceived as unavoidable. As a result, it is necessary to determine which
method of regulating and limiting the use of torture as a means of preventive interrogation is the
most effective. The ideal system of regulation will best achieve two goals, (1) limitation of
torture to that which is ideal or appropriate; and (2) support for the Rule of Law. While the
search for an ideal system of torture regulation may not yield a “best result” or even a “good
result,” to avoid the decision for fear of choosing among evils is irresponsible and a derogation
of government’s duty. Given the problems related to secrecy and accountability that inhere in
maintaining the status quo and in Gross’ Official Disobedience, it appears that Dershowitz’s
Torture Warrants most effectively achieve both a limited quantity and type of torture while
preserving the Rule of Law.
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